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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

JERRY DEE GRIFFITHS,

Case No. 860326

Defendant/Appellant.

Category No. 2

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
The Statement of the Case and Statement of the Facts are
set forth in Brief of Appellant at pages one through four.

The

Appellant takes this opportunity to reply the Points II and III of
Respondent's Brief.
POINT I.
(Reply to Respondent's Point III)
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY
In his opening brief, Mr. Griffiths argued that the trial
court committed prejudicial error by not giving one of his proposed
eyewitness identification jury instructions.

Mr. Griffiths relied

primarily on this Court's decision in State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378
(Utah 1986).
In its response brief, the State contended that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give any of the
requested instructions.

The State relied on the pre State v. Long,

721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) cases and in reaching its conclusion that
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.

While the State is

correct in its assertion that Long does not control the instant
case, the conclusion that the Court did not abuse its discretion is
incorrect.
This Court set the applicable pre-Long standards in two
recent cases, State v. Jonas, supra and State v. Quevedo, 54 Utah
Adv. Rep. 18 (March 26, 1987).

The pre-Long standard is as follows:

"Prior to Long, the law was that it lay within a
trial judge's discretion whether an eyewitness
identification instruction . . . was given,
[citations omitted] However, this Court also
stated prior to Long that the failure to give an
eyewitness instruction might be an abuse of
discretion where there were serious questions
about the reliability of the eyewitness
identificatione [citations omitted] (emphasis
added).
State v. Quevedo, supra at 2.
In State v. Jonas, supra, this Court held for the first
time that a trial judge had abused his discreiton in failing to give
a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction.

In Jonas,

serious questions as to the reliability of the identification arose
where:

(1) the victim had little opportunity to observe his

assailant; (2) the witness initially described his assailant as
clean-shaven, but later changed his description to include a
mustache; (3) the witness described an assailant with a crooked nose
yet selected a photo of the Appellant who did not have a crooked
nose; (4) the victim's trial testimony showed that he was uncertain
and hesitant in the way in which he selected the defendant during
the photo array; and, (5) there were no other witnesses or
corroborating evidence.
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In State v. QuevedO/ supra, this Court did not find serious
questions as to the reliability of the eyewitness identification and
held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing
to give a cautionary instruction.

In Quevedo, four police officers,

trained in making such identifications, positively identified the
defendant at trial as the driver of a vehicle fleeing a robbery
scene.

Furthermore, one of the officers had known the defendant for

three years.

The officers located Quevedo in a nearby apartment

shortly after the fleeing getaway car crashed.

An occupant of the

apartment stated, "I don't know what he done, he just ran in here."
At the time of his arrest Quevedo wore the same jacket that the
fleeing driver had worn.
The identifications in the instant case are subject to the
same serious concerns as to their reliablity as was the
identification in Jonas.

The witnesses in the instant case gave

differing descriptions of their assailant concerning whether or not
he had a full moustache.
At the police line-up held on February 4, 1986, Mr. Smith
and Mr. Herbert were unable to identify Mr. Griffiths as their
assailant (T. 39, 153). Ms. Herbert positively identified a member
of the line-up other than Mr. Griffiths as the gunman (T. 138). The
witnesses at Rocky Mountain Video described their assailant as
having a slight moustache, yet Dr. Smith testified that on January
6, 1986, Mr. Griffiths has a "very exaggerated moustache" (T. 8).
The prosecutor in this case was so concerned about the
identification by the victims of this robbery that he took the
unusual step of calling Ms. Silcox to testify concerning Mr.
- 3 -

Griffiths1 appearance in December (See Appellant's Brief Point III.,
p. 15-17).

The prosecutor stated, "Judge, as you know, there are a

number of other cases and identification in appearance becomes very
critical" (Te 19). The prosecutor went on to state, "He's changed
his appearance so dramatically, Judge, as you've heard, three of
these witnesses could not pick him out at the line-up.

And so the

alteration of appearance becomes absolutely critical to me. . ." (T.
21).

Thus even the prosecutor in this case admitted that eyewitness

identification was crucial to this case.
In State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980) this Court
stated that:

"Defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on

his theory of the crime if there is any basis in the evidence to
support that theory".

In this case the defense theory was a faulty

eye-witness identification.

This theory is supported by the

inability of the witnesses to identify Mr. Griffiths at the line-up
and the prosecutor's admission that "identification in appearance
becomes very critical" (T. 19).
Corroborating evidence sufficient to overcome the serious
doubts as to the identification of Mr. Griffiths as the gunman did
not exist in this case.

There was no physical evidence that placed

Mr. Griffiths in the video store.

Mr. Mouritsen testified that he

heard "something that sounded like a shot and then saw a man running
diagonally across the street limping seriously" (T. 102-03).
However, Mouritsen was not able to identify the person he saw
running down the street.
A careful review of the facts in this case establishes that
they are aligned with those in Jonas.
- 4
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Three of the witnesses to the

robbery were not able to identify Mr. Griffiths from a police
line-up.

Furthermore, the prosecutor in the case was so concerned

with the identification issue that he called Ms. Silcox, a victim of
another robbery, to testify concerning Mr. Griffiths' appearance at
the time of the robbery.

The remaining evidence presented by the

State failed to corroborate the identification so as to overcome the
serious doubts that Mr. Griffiths was the man who robbed Rocky
Mountain Video.

Because of this, the trial judge abused his

discretion in failing to give the requested cautionary
identification instruction.
POINT II.
(Reply to Respondent's Point II)
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL SINCE
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVIDE DEFENSE
COUNSEL WITH STATEMENTS MADE BY
MR. GRIFFITHS TO THE POLICE BEFORE TRIAL.
In his opening brief, Mr. Griffiths argued that the trial
court committed reversible error in denying his motion for a
mistrial where the prosecutor failed to provide defense counsel with
statements allegedly made by Mr. Griffiths to Detective Ron Edwards
shortly after his arrest on the charge in the present case. Mr.
Griffiths relied principally on State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah
1975) and State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985).
In its response, the State contended that reversal of the
conviction is not warranted since there is no reasonable likelihood
that absent the prosecutor's failure to disclose the evidence to
defense counsel, the outcome of the trial would have been more
- 5
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favorable to Mr. Griffiths.

The state focused primarily on State v.

Knight, 53 Utah Adv. Rep. 13,

P.2d

(Utah 1987) which this

court decided after Mr. Griffiths filed his brief.
In State v. Knight, supra, this court reversed a conviction
for aggravated robbery where the prosecutor failed to provide the
defense with inculpatory evidence comprised of the current addresses
and phone numbers of two witnesses and statements made by such
witnesses which tended to refute the defendant's alibi defense.

In

Knight, this Court acknowledges that:
When . . . the error consists of the
prosecution's failure to provide a defendant with
inculpatory evidence, the record does not provide
much assistance in discovering the nature or
magnitude of the resulting prejudice to the
defendant.
State v. Knight, supra at 17.
Because the reviewing Court is left to speculate as to the
possible effect on the outcome caused by the state's wrongful
failure to disclose inculpatory evidence, "it seems appropriate in
such instances to place the burden on the state to persuade a court
that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defense.

Therefore,

when the defendant can make a credible argument that the
prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense, it is up to the state
to persuade the court that there is no reasonable likelihood that
absent the error, the outcome of trial would have been more
favorable for the defendant."

State v. Knight, supra at 17.

The State's failure to disclose the inculpatory evidence
impaired Mr. Griffith's defense by damaging defense counsel's
ability to formulate a pretrial strategy and adequately prepare for
- 6 -

trial*1

Because the state did not inform defense counsel of the

statements, counsel did not question his client, his own witness or
Detective Edwards as to the details of such statements prior to
trial.

He did not focus on the statements in deciding whether to

use Ms. Newsome as a witness.

As the state speculates in its brief,

"(p)erhaps he would have reconsidered using Newsome as an alibi
witness, had he known that the state would present his post-arrest
statements".

Respondent's Brief at 13.

The state then points out

that "on the other hand" defense counsel "may well have chosen to
take his chances with Newsome". Respondent's Brief at 14.
Regardless of whether defense counsel ultimately decided to use
Newsome as a witness, the state's failure to provide defendant with
:he statements denied counsel an opportunity to adequately
Investigate such statements and make an informed decision as to
/hether to use Ms. Newsome as an alibi witness.
In addition, defense counsel was unable to adequately
prepare to meet and refute such statements.

The statements were

introduced by the prosecution as rebuttal to a witness the defense
had determined was important enough to put on the stand as part of
its case.

Had the statements been disclosed, defense counsel may

1

The State concedes in its brief that the prosecutor did not fully
comply with the discovery order (Respondent's Brief at 11). In
State v. Knight, supra, the defense sought to discover material not
specifically mentioned in Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16, 1953 as amended). In the instant case,
the inculpatory evidence consisted of statements allegedly made by
the defendant. Such evidence is specifically mentioned in Rule
16(a)(2) and is not the type evidence which would have led a
prosecutor to believe that he did not have a duty to disclose.
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have been able to refute such statements or otherwise dispel their
impact by information learned from questioning the defendant, Ms.
Newsome and Detective Edwards as part of his pretrial preparation.
Since the state's failure to disclose the statements
impaired Mr. Griffith's defense, the State has the burden of proving
that the error was not prejudicial.
18.

See State v. Knight, supra at

To meet this burden, the State must show that "despite the

errors, the outcome of the trial merits confidence and there is no
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant."
State v. Knight, supra at 18.
The state fails in its argument to specifically point out
what facts and circumstances it relies on in this case to sustain
its burden of proof.

Instead, the state makes the unsupported

statement "the circumstances of defendant's case, which are outlined
above, persuasively establish that the error did not unfairly
prejudice the defense."

Respondent's Brief at 14.

As Mr. Griffiths argued in Point I of his brief, this case
involved considerable uncertainty as to the identification of Mr.
Griffiths as the perpetrator of the robbery.

Only one out of four

witnesses was able to pick Mr. Griffiths out of a lineup.

Pretrial

strategy and preparation in deciding whether to use Ms. Newsome as a
witness or how to refute Detective Edwards testimony were critical
in this case.

As this Court pointed out in Knight, neither the

Court nor the state could presume that Georgie Moore's testimony was
correct.

Similarly in this case, neither the Court nor State can

presume that Detective Edwards' testimony was true.
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Given the circumstances of this case and the statefs
failure to provide any support for its contention that the defendant
was not prejudiced by the nondisclosure, the State has failed to
sustain its burden of proving that the outcome of the trial was
unaffected by the State's nondisclosure of the inclupatory
evidence.

This Court cannot presume under the circumstances of this

case that the outcome was unaffected and the conviction should
therefore be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, Jerry
Dee Griffiths, asks this Court to reverse his conviction and remand
his case to the District Court for either dismissal or a new trial.
Respectfully Submitted, this

//

day of June, 1987.

I^NN R. BROWN
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, LYNN R. BROWN, hereby certify that four copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief will be delivered to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, this

//

day of June, 1987.

J^TNN R. BROWN
Attorney for Appellant
DELIVERED by

this

June, 1987.
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